Introduction
Popular discussion of recessions emphasizes the high costs borne by workers as a consequence of increased job loss. This view of recessions has in turn been amply documented by empirical research. Blanchard and Diamond (1990) , for example, nd that gross ows of workers out of employment in Current Population Survey data are strongly countercyclical, and further, recessionary employment reductions are explained chiey by ows out of employment. Using plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) document the countercyclicality of job destruction in manufacturing industries, with recessions being associated with spikes in the rate of destruction. The high costs of job loss, moreover, are no less clearly validated by the data. Ruhm (1991) draws on the PSID to demonstrate that individual displaced workers experience signicantly greater unemployment, and lower wages, in years following job loss. Further evidence is discussed in Topel (1993) and Hall (1995) .
The strong countercyclicality and high cost of job loss points to di¢culties in the operation of the labor market, but the nature of these di¢culties has long puz- 1 rigidity of wages as a source of labor-market imperfections that drive recessionary employment reductions. In Hashimoto and Yu (1980) and Hall and Lazear (1984) , rigidity of real wages accounts for ine¢cient separations: a temporary reduction in the rms valuation of the employment relationship can lead to job loss that is costly to the worker. These papers, however, assume that renegotiation of wage contracts is restricted in the face of shocks leading to costly separation. Thus, the rm and worker are forced to forgo mutual benets from wage adjustment that would preserve the employment relationship, but the reasons for such restrictions on renegotiation are not clearly spelled out.
In this paper we present a new theory of labor contracting that can explain costly countercyclical job destruction without resort to suppression of renegotiation. Our rst point of departure is the observation that employment relationships may be subject to severe di¢culties in maintaining correct incentives on the part of both the rm and worker. In our theory, employment relationships take the form of a repeated prisoners dilemma: each side can benet in the short-run by engaging in opportunistic behavior at the partners expense. For the worker, opportunism can take the form of shirking behavior, as has been studied in the literature on e¢ciency wages. It has not been widely recognized, however, that the rm also has wide latitude for opportunism that is costly for the worker. By manipulating job assignments, provision of benets, worker-specic investment and managerial or entrepreneurial e¤ort, the rm can realize short-term advantages that correspond to reductions in the returns obtained by the worker. When incentives for cooperative behavior cannot be maintained, the cooperative outcome collapses into the Pareto-dominated selsh outcome that in our model is associated with ine¢cient separation.
We combine this view of employment relationships with a second key ingredient:
the productivity of the relationship is assumed to depend on up-front specic investments made by the rm. Incentives for ongoing cooperation, hinging as they do on the period-by-period returns generated by the relationship, are inuenced in turn by the rms investments that determine these returns. Thus, rms face a trade-o¤ in forging relationships with their workers. High levels of up-front investment yield high ongoing returns, and correspondingly incentives to cooperate remain robust to transitory negative productivity shocks. Such an employment relationship may be referred to as a robust contract. Low levels of investment, on the other hand, reduce the level of ongoing returns, making it impossible to sustain incentives in the face of these shocks. Such relationships, called fragile contracts, imply that mutually harmful separations may occur in bad productivity states. Importantly, robust contracts are costly to the rm to the extent that they require greater up-front investment.
Our central result is that rms will select fragile contracts when (i) incentive problems are severe, as measured by private gains obtained by the rm and worker from double-crossing their partner; and (ii) the bad productivity state occurs with su¢ciently small probability. Severe incentive problems lead to binding constraints on up-front investment levels that are tighter in the bad state. When the probability of the bad state is su¢ciently low, the expected return obtained by the rm from preserving the employment relationship in the face of the shock is exceeded by the cost of the added investment needed to satisfy the incentive constraint, so that the rm instead chooses a fragile relationship at a lower level of investment. Moreover, under the fragile contract, separation occurs in the bad state even though the rm and worker have unlimited ability to renegotiate the wage contract, i.e. costly job loss occurs even with perfectly exible wages.
To analyze the e¤ects of aggregate shocks on employment relationships, we assume that employment relationships are formed on a matching market, where pools of unmatched rms and workers seek to locate suitable partners. Stationary investment/matching equilibria in which rms choose fragile contracts are derived. In these equilibria, bad productivity states on the rm level may be associated with aggregate recessionary states, with the frequency and severity of recessions being roughly consistent with quarterly data on U.S. business cycles. Independent and identically-distributed recession shocks induce short, sharp output declines associated with bursts of job destruction, followed by gradual recoveries as relationships are reformed on the matching market. Thus, the model replicates both the observed asymmetry of business cycles and the greater cyclical variability of job destruction.
Moreover, contractual fragility serves as a powerful internal propagation mechanism:
calibrating the model to gross job ow statistics reported by Davis and Haltiwanger, we generate simulated output data in which underlying aggregate productivity shocks are magnied seven times in their e¤ect on output, and moreover, the correlation of current and lagged output is over 0.4 despite the fact that the productivity shocks are i.i.d. By way of comparison, in a standard real business cycle model, our specication of productivity shocks produces no magnication and an autocorrelation of only about 0.1.
In our theory, job loss that is costly for both the rm and worker occurs as a consequence of incentive constraints that cannot be overcome when the bad state arises.
This suggests a new role for government policies that strengthen the employment relationship by loosening incentive constraints and promoting robust contracts. Imposing a ring tax, for example, directly weakens constraints and raises the relative profitability of robust contracts. Alternatively, government policy can function to smooth rents over time by taxing the employment relationship in good productivity states and subsidizing it in bad states. We show that a balanced-budget rent-smoothing Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) present a model of sectoral shifts and job destruction in a matching market that also generates recession-induced bursts of job destruction and business-cycle asymmetry, albeit with highly persistent underlying productivity shocks.
scheme can shift the economy to a Pareto-superior robust-contract equilibrium by loosening incentive constraints in the bad state, when they are most binding, while tightening constraints in the good state.
Our paper builds on the large theoretical literature relating macroeconomic phenomena to microeconomic models of the employment relationship. In particular, the literature on e¢ciency wages, most notably the papers of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , Danthine and Donaldson (1990) , Strand (1992) , Malcomson (1993,1995) , and MacLeod, Malcomson, and Gomme (1994), has emphasized the importance of incentive constraints and outside opportunities for equilibrium wage contracts and the operation of the labor market. As emphasized above, our theory takes a more general view of opportunism in the employment relationship, allows for unrestricted renegotiation of contracts, and stresses the role of specic investment in determining contracts. Additionally, unlike the previous literature, we focus on i.i.d.
productivity shocks as sources of cyclical uctuations.
The model of bilateral contractual relationships in a matching market considered here constitutes a version of the model rst developed in Ramey and Watson (1996) ; in our former paper, up-front investment by both partners and choice of organizational form are considered, while here we allow for random productivity and endogenous severance of relationships. As in our earlier paper, we emphasize that the degree of market friction, as reected by the probability that an unmatched agent nds a trading partner in a given period, exerts a strong inuence on the form of the equilibrium contract. In particular, we show that fragile contract equilibria are associated with low degrees of market friction that raise the value of opportunities outside of the relationship, thereby weakening incentives to maintain the relationship.
Our view of contractual fragility as an explanation for countercyclical job destruction can be contrasted with the notion that job destruction is driven by the need to replace existing relationships that become economically or technologically obsolete. The basic idea underlying the latter restructuring view of job destruction is that existing employment relationships tend to decline in productivity over time, necessitating separation in order to form more productive relationships; further, such restructuring is most e¢cient during times of low aggregate productivity.
Recent work on the restructuring view includes Hosios (1994) Our model of the employment relationship consists of two agents: a single rm and a single worker. Employment relationships are ongoing, in the sense that production continues through time until the relationship is severed. As part of the production process, in each period the rm and worker make a short-term decision a¤ecting returns within the period. For simplicity, we assume there are two possible shortterm decisions for each of the agents: an agent may make a cooperative decision that contributes to the joint productivity of the relationship, or else the agent may make a selsh decision that raises the agents own benets at the expense of his behavior might damage production capacity in some way; for example, shirking by the worker may cause equipment to be destroyed.
By way of motivation, x w can be interpreted as added utility obtained by the worker from reducing on-the-job e¤ort, as well as gains from opportunistic practices such as theft. The rms short-term decision can be regarded as an e¤ort choice on the part of the rms owner or manager, in parallel to the e¤ort choice of the worker. More generally, selsh behavior by the rm may involve exploiting its ability to direct the workers on-the-job activity and to structure the workplace. The rm # As far as the allowable contracts over which agents can renegotiate, we assume that agents can commit to transfers that may be made contingent on whether or not the employment relationship is severed. Thus, the contract can specify an up-front transfer made at the beginning of the productive relationship, a wage to be paid to the worker as long has he or she is employed, and perhaps a severence transfer. Note however that the contract cannot condition transfers on e¤ort levels, and also the contract can be renegotiated at any time. See the Appendix for further discussion of the legal setting and one particular specication of the wage contract. 
where x = x f + x w and w = w f + w w . The parameter ± indicates the discount factor common to both agents. We will refer to (1) as the e¤ort constraint. The left-hand side of the e¤ort constraint consists of the current-period net return plus the discounted expected stream of returns in future periods, while the right-hand side gives the sum of returns that each agent would receive from double-crossing his partner. Importantly, this condition is necessary for cooperation no matter how the agents divide the returns from the relationship, and irrespective of any renegotiation of prior wage contracts to which the agents might have agreed. As soon as (1) fails, at least one agent will prefer to choose low e¤ort and induce the relationship to be severed. & % Our framework thus generalizes standard e¢ciency wage models, in which opportunism by the worker involves avoiding the disutility of e¤ort and opportunism by the rm simply involves ring the worker (assumptions elucidated well by Malcomson (1993,1995) ). & It is obvious that condition (1) is necessary even though the agents are able to renegotiate their contract. To show that it is su¢cient, we specify in the Appendix a particular form of contract between the worker and the rm that sustains cooperation.
The inability to sustain incentives for high e¤ort can lead to separations in otherwise e¢cient relationships. The scope for such separations is illustrated in Figure 1 , which gives a graphical depiction of incentives within the employment relationship. ' On the vertical axis we have the productivity of the worker within the relationship, while the horizontal axis gives the value of opportunities outside of the relationship.
Thus, any realization ofz giving a point above the 45 ± line represents an e¢cient relationship, in the sense that the partners obtain greater benets from continuing the relationship than from severing it. Correspondingly, points below the 45 ± line indicate that the relationship is ine¢cient and should be severed.
The value of x is indicated on the vertical axis, and the e¤ort constraint is represented as a line sloping upward from this point. Any outcome above the latter line, such as the point labelled G; satises the e¤ort constraint, since the value of continuing the relationship, net of the agents gains from double-crossing their partners, exceeds the value of outside opportunities. Points below the line, such as point B, fail the e¤ort constraint, since the value of continuing the relationship becomes too small to dissuade agents from choosing low e¤ort and severing the relationship.
Here, due to the prisoners dilemma form of the employment relationship, both the worker and the rm expend low e¤ort and the relationship dissolves. The shaded area gives a region of points at which the relationship is severed as a consequence of failure to satisfy the e¤ort constraint, despite the fact that both agents would prefer the relationship to continue. In other words, separation may occur even though a relationship is e¢cient, due to the agents inability to prevent themselves from taking actions that destroy the relationship.
It is instructive to compare this incentives-based theory of separations to the alternative rigid-contracts view proposed by Hashimoto and Yu (1980) and Hall and Lazear (1984) . The latter can be represented within the current framework by eliminating the e¤ort choices and introducing a prior contract specifying a wage of m that is paid to the worker in each period. There may arise e¢cient outcomes in which either the rm or the worker wishes to sever the relationship because m is too high or too low, respectively. In this case, separations occur because the rm and worker are prevented from renegotiating the wage following the realization ofz, which they would clearly wish to do in view of the e¢ciency of their relationship. Our theory, in contrast, ties separations to incentive problems that exist irrespective of agents freedom to rewrite wage contracts. The key idea is that agents are incapable of preserving their rents due to their inability to contract directly on their e¤ort choices.
' It is obvious that condition (1) is necessary for sustaining high-e¤ort incentives even when the agents may renegotiate their contract. To show that it is su¢cient, we specify in the Appendix a particular form of contract between the worker and the rm that sustains cooperation.
Specic Investment and Contractual Fragility.
The robustness of incentives within a relationship will depend in general on investments made by the agents a¤ecting the productivity of the relationship. To consider this issue, we extend the model by assuming that the rm makes an investment ® in relationship-specic capital, having no value outside of the relationship. For example, the rm may commit resources to train the worker, to purchase specialized equipment for the worker, or to tailor the o¢ce or production unit to the workers style or needs. The investment If the e¤ort constraint could be ignored, then the rm would choose ® to solve the following unconstrained problem:
where g R (®) denotes the expected discounted return stream as a function of ®:
Let ® U denote the solution to (2) . The solution to (2) becomes infeasible, however, if the e¤ort constraint binds. This possibility is illustrated in Figure 2 , where the
In bargaining over the contract, the threat point corresponds to the rm and the worker staying together and choosing low e¤ort, giving each a payo¤ of zero. The outside opportunity obtained by severing the relationship is treated as a constraint on the negotiations. Further, the initial contract is negotiated subject to the constraint that its terms may be renegotiated in future periods. See Ramey and Watson (1996) for further details on how contract negotiation is modelled in this setting. The rms prot-maximizing robust contract is determined by the following constrained optimization problem:
where the constraint specializes (1) Alternatively, the rm may decide that the added investment needed to achieve a robust contract is not worth the cost. In this case, the rm may choose an investment level that violates the e¤ort constraint in the bad state, leading the rm and worker to expend low e¤ort and sever the relationship; we call this a fragile contract. The prot-maximizing fragile contract is determined as follows:
Observe that g F (®), the discounted expected return stream under the fragile contract, reects the fact that the relationship terminates upon realization of the bad state. In (4), the e¤ort constraint need only be satised in the good state, given that the agents anticipate severing the relationship once the bad state arises; thus, the constraint now includes g F (®) as the expected future value from continuing the relationship. The solution to (4) will be denoted by ® F .
Although (4) presumes that separation will occur in the event that the bad state arises, the agents might attempt to renegotiate their relationship to avoid separating in the bad state. Specically, they may renegotiate to a robust contract. We show in the following proposition, however, that if the rm prefers to select a fragile contract, then renegotiation from a fragile to a robust contract cannot occur upon realization of the bad state, and thus the agents are incapable of preserving their relationship.
must be violated at ® = ® F .
Intuitively, when the robust e¤ort constraint holds at a given level of investment, the value of the robust contract exceeds the value of the fragile contract. Therefore, if the rm settles on a fragile contract, then the robust contract is not feasible at the chosen level of investment. It follows that the bad state leads to ine¢cient separation under the fragile contract, despite the complete absence of restrictions on the agents ability to renegotiate the contract. What prevents the relationship from continuing is that investment cannot be raised immediately following the negative productivity shock.
Prospects for severance of the employment relationship turn on the rms comparison of the robust and fragile contracts. In fact, the rm will necessarily prefer the fragile contract, as long as (i) the robust e¤ort constraint is not satised at the solution to the unconstrained investment problem, and (ii) the bad state arises with su¢ciently small probability. To see this, note rst that the e¤ort constraint will necessarily be tighter under the robust contract than under the fragile contract when ½ is small:
which is implied by:
Further, for small ½ there is a range of values of x and w such that ® U violates the robust-contract e¤ort constraint; this range of x and w may be indicated as follows:
Condition (6) ensures that we have a situation like that shown in Figure 2 , in which outcome B lies below the e¤ort-constraint line. From (5) it follows that the objective functions in (2), (3) and (4) become identical as ½ approaches zero. Combining this fact with (6), we have that the constraint in (3) must bind for small ½, so that (4) will give strictly greater prots as a consequence of its looser constraint. This completes the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose (6) holds. Then the rm prefers to choose a fragile contract when ½ is su¢ciently small.
The rms choice of a fragile contract when ½ is small derives from the tradeo¤ between the benets of robust incentives in the relationship and the costs of investment needed to secure these incentives. In view of (6), the rm is compelled to pay an added cost in the form of increased investment in order to obtain a robust contract, satisfying the e¤ort constraint in the bad state. Investment in a robust contract yields a positive marginal return as long as separation is ine¢cient. When the bad state is relatively unlikely, however, this marginal return is obtained with small probability, and the rm prefers to settle for a fragile contract by choosing a smaller investment level.
It follows that endogenous separations may emerge from rms decisions to make employment relationships nonrobust to low-probability productivity shocks. Importantly, the scope for separations is not tied to the size of the shocks, as (6) can readily be satised even when z G (®) ¡ z B (®) is small relative to z G (®) (in such cases, the fragile e¤ort constraint will also tend to bind). The key idea is that relatively small, infrequent shocks may have a large e¤ect on incentives in employment relationships. We now expand our model by allowing rms and workers to come together to form relationships in a matching market.
In addition to endogenizing the value of the outside opportunity w, this will allow us to relate ine¢cient separations to aggregate productivity shocks.
The matching market is assumed to consist of equally-sized pools of rms and workers. At the start of each period, a given unmatched rm or worker successfully locates a partner with probability¸. A newly-matched pair initiates an employment relationship of the form considered in the preceding sections: the rm chooses its investment ®; a contract is negotiated; and the production process begins. With probability 1¡¸, an unmatched agent is unsuccessful, and the agent must wait until the start of the next period before making another attempt to nd a partner. The assumption of a constant matching probability greatly simplies the analysis in the present context; in the Conclusion we discuss how the analysis is a¤ected when the matching probability may uctuate through time.
Matched pairs engage in ongoing production relationships of the form introduced in Section 2. Importantly, we allow the random net returnsz in a given period to be correlated across matched pairs, reecting the possibility of aggregate productivity shocks. As before, ½ indicates the probability that a given pair realizes the bad state, and the realizations ofz are independent across periods. To ensure that the matching pools remain nondegenerate, we will allow for exogenous separations, occurring with probability¯in each period. These separations reect events that are not tied directly to incentives in the relationship, e.g. the worker may need to relocate for personal reasons. Exogeneous separations are assumed to occur only at the end of a period.
The joint values to both the rm and worker of the employment relationship under the robust and fragile contracts will be indicated by v R (w) and v F (w), respectively, dened as follows: Thus, with probability¸, an individual agent in the matching pool at the start of a period will match with a partner, and in this case they begin an employment relationship having joint value v(w). With probability 1 ¡¸, they fail to match, and they begin the next period in the matching pools. It follows that the equilibrium condition for w is given by:
where 1 =¸=(1 ¡ (1 ¡¸)±).
The second condition for a market equilibrium is necessarily satised for workers:
they obtain nonnegative returns for every w¸0, since they make no investments and obtain a share of the positive returns generated by relationships. For rms to make nonnegative returns at positive investment levels, ¼ must not be too close to zero, so that marginal returns to investing exceed marginal costs. Further, x cannot be too
We also need to show that, after the investment is made, the employment relationship gives the rm and worker at least the value of their outside option, i.e. payo¤s in the relationship exceed ±w i for i = f; w. Note that there always exists a trivial equilibrium in which rms invest zero and both agents choose low e¤ort immediately upon being matched.
large, else g i (®) ¡ ® < 0 at levels of ® large enough to satisfy the e¤ort constraints.
The Appendix derives a set of restrictions on ¼ and x that are su¢cient to assure existence of market equilibria with positive investment for the case of ½ su¢ciently small.
3.2.
Fragile Contracts and Aggregate Shocks.
We now consider conditions under which rms choose fragile contracts in equilibrium. To do this, it is useful rst to isolate the market equilibrium arising when the e¤ort constraint does not bind.
In such an equilibrium, for the case ½ = 0, the rm chooses ® to solve the following 
Here the e¤ort constraint incorporates the possibility of exogenous separation, as does the function g R (®). For small ½, the fragile e¤ort constraint is not as tight as the robust constraint. Given (8) , it follows that the robust e¤ort constraint will bind in any market equilibrium, and rms will strictly prefer to choose the fragile contract, according to the argument developed in Section 2. This completes the proof of the following proposition. In the equilibrium derived in Proposition 3, equilibrium contracts depend on the probability ½ that an individual rm/worker pair experiences a bad productivity
In the Appendix it is veried that the restriction (8) Propagation of Aggregate Shocks. In the equilibrium derived in the preceding subsection, independent and identically distributed aggregate productivity shocks generate output dynamics matching the stylized features of business cycles:
short, sharp recessions are balanced by longer, more gradual recoveries. Further, the size of the productivity shocks themselves can be small relative to the size of the output reductions associated with separation. Shocks become greatly magnied when they occur infrequently and when incentive problems within employment relationships ! This occurs because the value of entering the matching pool is invariant to the contemporaneous correlation of productivity shocks in this model: because the number of potential rms is xed, the relative sizes of the pools of unmatched rms and workers is constant; and the matching probability depends only on the relative sizes of the unmatched pools. We can introduce free entry by rms or nonconstant-returns matching technologies, but this adds complications to the derivation of market equilibria without altering our main insights, as discussed in the Conclusion. values, all rms select fragile contracts in the market equilibrium. Observe that the productivity shock a is specied so that output in the bad state is 85% of output in the good state. The value of · is set very low in order to generate sharply diminishing returns to investment in the neighborhood of equilibrium investment levels; this may be interpreted as reecting indivisibilities in investment that make it very costly to loosen e¤ort constraints.
" The bargaining parameter ¼ is set to unity, corresponding to the contractible-investment case, while the sum of gains from dishonest behavior,
given by x, is roughly two times output in the good state. # The remaining parameters are set to give reasonable matches to quarterly data. In particular, the indicated values of » and Á imply that a recession shock hits roughly every 18 quarters, leading about seven and one-quarter percent of rm/worker pairs to experience the bad productivity state. The implied value ½ = 0:004 is su¢ciently small to support the fragile equilibrium. The relatively large value of¯is chosen to match the high rates of ongoing job creation and destruction found by Davis and Haltiwanger. The equilibrium dynamics of aggregate output for 10,000-period runs are assessed in the Table 3 . The rst column reports summary statistics for aggregate output, the productivity shock a and aggregate consumption cons, where the latter is dened as aggregate output in a period less the total investment made by newly-matched pairs. Observe that the standard deviation of output in the fragile equilibrium is nearly seven times larger than the standard deviation of the driving process a. In other words, contractual fragility leads underlying productivity shocks to be magnied nearly seven times in exerting their e¤ect on output. This number may be understood as follows: the 15% drop in productivity caused by the productivity shock leads to severance of the employment relationship and a corresponding 100% decline in output, so that contractual fragility directly magnies productivity shocks by over six times. Additional magnication results from the fact that employment relationships are reformed only gradually. The latter e¤ect leads the productivity shocks to be highly persistent: output autocorrelation is over 40%, despite the fact that the underlying shocks are independent across time. The second column reports statistics for simulated data under the alternative assumption that e¤ort is directly contractible, in which case the e¤ort constraint can be ignored. Mean output is lower than in the fragile equilibrium, reecting the fact that equilibrium investment is given by the solution ® U = 0:0687 to problem (2), as opposed to the much higher level ® F = 0:4213 in the fragile equilibrium. Note however that mean consumption is lower in the fragile equilibrium; in this example, the inability to contract on e¤ort leads mean consumption to be reduced by about 1.6%. Further, magnication and persistence are nil in the contractible-e¤ort case.
Finally, the third column gives comparable statistics for a standard real business cycle model subject to the driving process a. In particular, we compute the following: where°= 5, ± = 0:975, ¾ = 0:3 and ³ = 0:05. We set Ã = 0:638 to match mean output in the contractible-e¤ort case. As shown in the table, the productivity shocks are not magnied in the RBC benchmark, and only modest persistence is generated. It follows that contractual fragility provides a much stronger internal propagation mechanism than is present in the RBC model. Magnication and Output Loss. We have emphasized how productivity shocks are magnied in their e¤ect on output. In this subsection we further explore the potential for shock magnication and establish the limits of magnication that can be generated by our model. Since magnication depends on fragile employment contracts, this exercise involves deriving conditions under which fragile equilibria arise.
Consider a setting in which rms select fragile contracts in market equilibrium. That is, there is a lower bound on the size of the production shock necessary for fragile equilibria.
&
As noted above, the shock ¹ roughly corresponds to magnication of ¹ ¡1 , since the agents expend low e¤ort, causing returns to be zero, when the shock occurs. ' Magnication is thus bounded above by ¤´1=¹(½;¯). Figure 3 graphs ¤ as a function of ½ under various values of¯, including the value used in the simulation of the preceding subsection. Shock magnication is limited by ½, but can be arbitrarily large if ½ is su¢ciently close to zero. Point A corresponds to our simulation. Observe that for the parameter values of the simulation, the magnication bound is about 20, demonstrating that our specication of z leaves room for alternative functions delivering substantially greater shock magnication.
Magnication obviously implies reduced output when fragile contracts prevail, but the expected reduction is not monotone in the level of magnication. For example, magnication is greatest when ½ is very close to zero, but in such a setting the bad state occurs so infrequently as to have little e¤ect on expected output. This leads to a trade-o¤ between magnication and output reduction, which we can quantify. Note that, xing the investment level, if an active relationship were robust, the expected return in a given period would be z
The expected return from an active fragile relationship in the period is z G (®)(1 ¡ ½). The di¤erence between these values as a fraction of the former, which simplies to (½¡½¹)=(1¡½¹), measures the proportion of potential output in a given period that is lost due to contractual fragility. This value is decreasing in ¹; therefore, xing ½, an upper bound on the within-period output loss is given by L´(½ ¡ ½¹(½;¯))=(1 ¡ ½¹(½;¯)). Using the denitions of L and ¤, one can solve for L as a function of the ¤ (inverting ¹ to substitute for ½ and using ¤ = 1=¹), thereby obtaining the proportional output loss associated with the shocks giving the greatest possible magnication. We graph this relationship for various values of¯in Figure 4 , where higher magnication may be seen to correspond to lower output loss, based on the smaller value of ½ needed to sustain a fragile equilibrium. The simulation of the preceding section, located at point A, implies a within-period output loss of about 0:4 percent.
3.5.
Productivity Shocks and Job Destruction.
Thus far we have focussed on productivity shocks associated only with aggregate recessionary states. Given reasonable calibrations, these shocks can account for only a small percentage of average job destruction occurring from quarter to quarter, and to match the data we specied a relatively high value for the probability of exogenous separation¯. It is of interest, however, to consider whether ine¢cient separations associated with contractual & It is not di¢cult to show that the bound can be approximately achieved by choosing the functions z / and z * and the parameters¸and x appropriately.
' Since the shock also induces separation, its e¤ects are felt beyond the period in which it occurs, further lowering output relative to the setting in which relationships are robust. fragility can explain a larger percentage of total job destruction. To address this issue, we recalculate the fragile equilibrium conditions under a range of values of ½ and¯, subject to the restriction ½ +¯¡ ½¯= 0:052, i.e. steady-state job creation and destruction match the Davis-Haltiwanger data. The value of the productivity shock in the bad state, a B , is also allowed to vary, while the remaining parameters are set as in the Subsection 3.3. Note that for the simulation we have ¹ = 1 ¡ a B .
Results are given in Figure 5 , which indicates the lowest value of ¹ that can sustain a fragile equilibrium as a function of the proportion of job destruction explained by productivity shocks. Also graphed in the gure is the line ¹ = ¹(½; (0:052¡½)=(1¡½)), demonstrating how the simulation compares to the bound on production shocks derived in the preceding subsection. The equilibrium of Subsection 3.3 corresponds to point A, where a B = 0:85 and productivity shocks explain seven percent of total job destruction. If ½ is raised relative to¯, then robust contracts become relatively more attractive, and sustaining a fragile equilibrium requires that a B be lowered in order to tighten the robust e¤ort constraint. At point B , ½ and¯are set so that productivity shocks account for one-half of job destruction, and correspondingly a B must be reduced to 0.27. Even at this level, contractual fragility generates magnication of 1.45 in simulated data, with Corr[q t ; q t¡1 ] equal to 0.4150. In addition, within-period output loss due to fragility is about 0:7 percent, as designated by point B in Figure 4 . As Figure 5 shows, productivity shocks can explain 100% of job destruction if productivity is negative in the bad state, corresponding to ¹ > 1.
In this case, productivity shocks become damped in fragile equilibria, but in the equilibrium associated with point C separations continue to be ine¢cient. 4 .
Contractual Fragility and Welfare
4.1.
Equilibrium Characterization and Market Friction. We now assess more precisely the welfare implications of noncontractible e¤ort and contractual fragility. In particular, we focus on how the degree of market friction, as reected by the matching probability¸, a¤ects the form of the market equilibrium contract. In the following subsection we consider how policy interventions can help correct incentive problems in employment relationships.
Analysis of market equilibria is facilitated by the following proposition, which makes possible a simple diagrammatic characterization of equilibria. Let rms payo¤s upon initiation of an employment relationship be written p (7) . The equilibrium may be found in Figure 6 at the point where the ray w= 1 intersects the upper envelope of the curves v R (w) and v F (w).
The relationship between market friction and equilibrium contracts may now be easily assessed. For 1 <¸R , the intersection occurs at a point w ¤ < w R , and the unconstrained robust contract arises in equilibrium. In this case, the di¢culty of rematching, reecting a high degree of market friction, makes opportunities outside of the current relationship very unattractive, so that incentives within the relationship are easily sustained. For¸R < 1 <¸F , the e¤ort constraint becomes binding in the robust contract, necessitating an increase in investment; robust contracts continue to be chosen, however. Once 1 >¸F , opportunities outside of the relationship become so attractive that the fragile contract, being less sensitive to outside opportunities, comes to dominate the robust contract.
Thus, the degree of market friction a¤ects the robustness of employment relationships, and in particular, fragile equilibria are associated with low market friction. The key idea is that incentives within relationships are weakened when opportunities outside of the relationship become more attractive. As in the literature on e¢ciency wages, separation imposes a high penalty when market friction is high, allowing incentives for high e¤ort to be more easily sustained; further, in our model, low market friction has the added e¤ect of inducing ine¢cient separations associated with rms choice of fragile contracts.
4.2.
Policy Responses to Incentive Problems.
We have shown in the preceding sections that the di¢culty of providing incentives for high e¤ort may lead rms to adopt fragile contracts, generating social costs in the form of ine¢cient separation in bad productivity states. Government policy may play a direct role in alleviating contractual fragility by using taxes and transfers to weaken the e¤ort constraints facing rms and workers. In this subsection we consider two simple tax/subsidy schemes that can serve this purpose. Through most of the subsection we focus on the case of ¼ = 1, as with ¼ < 1 there are additional complications stemming from ine¢cient underinvestment by the rm.
The simplest form of intervention would impose a direct penalty on the agents in the event that a separation occurs, i.e. the government could levy a severance tax. Suppose the government can observe whether an employment relationship is severed as a consequence of low e¤ort by one or both agents, but cannot ascertain whether the worker or the rm initiated the separation. Conditional on such an endogenous separation, the government may levy a severance tax on either or both of the agents, thereby reducing x dollar-for-dollar by the amount of the tax. If the rm is required to pay the tax, for example, then x f is decreased by the amount of the tax, with x w remaining unchanged. Lowering x serves to loosen the e¤ort constraints and encourage the rm to adopt a robust contract.
The e¤ect of a ring tax on equilibrium contracts is shown in Figure 7 . Since ¼ = 1 is assumed, we have p i (w) = v i (w) for i = R; F , so that equilibrium contracts correspond to e¤ort-constrained e¢cient contracts. The ring tax e¤ectively reduces x, shifting v R (w) and v F (w) from the solid to the dashed curves. This raises the threshold value w R below which the robust contract is unconstrained and also increases the values of both the robust and fragile contracts on the regions where the e¤ort constraints bind. Equilibrium contracts shift from low-value fragile contracts at point A to high-value unconstrained robust contracts at point B . More generally, robust contracts with rst-best investment levels are always sustainable by choosing a su¢ciently high ring tax.
Alternatively, the goverment can mandate transfers between the agents conditional on severence; for example, the rm might be required to give the worker severence pay. Such a policy will not a¤ect equilibrium contracts, however. As Lazear (1990) and others have recognized, mandated transfers between the worker and rm have no e¤ect on the employment relationship when e¢cient renegotiation is possible. This is because severence pay has no e¤ect on the sum of the agents outside opportunities or their values from opportunistic behavior: it may lower x B , but it raises x M by the same amount.
Thus, a ring tax increases the value of the relationship to both the rm and the worker by relaxing incentive constraints. Other authors have developed alternative views based on models of costly labor adjustment, wherein a ring tax preserves some relationships but lowers the ex ante value of relationships to rms by reducing exibility. See Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), and Saint-Paul (1995) for the development of these ideas.
Despite the appeal of a severance tax, the policy has some drawbacks. The government may not directly observe whether individual employment relationships are severed, relying instead on evidence provided by the workers and the rms. However these agents may have no incentive to provide such information.
!
In any case, the government may have di¢culty verifying whether a separation occurs as a consequence of low e¤ort as opposed to for exogenous reasons, so that a ring tax may need to be imposed on all separations irrespective of cause. This may discourage formation of employment relationships since the tax must be borne in the event of exogenous separations. Further, wealth constraints may make it di¢cult to collect the tax, particularly in low-productivity states.
These problems can be circumvented by means of an alternative tax/subsidy scheme that smooths returns over the good and bad states. Suppose the government observes at the end of each period whether a rm and worker sever their relationship, but not the reason for the separation. The government can also observe the productivity state prevailing in the period. As long as severance has not occurred, the government imposes a tax ¿ > 0 on the rm following good states, and distributes a subsidy ¿ (1 ¡ ½)=½ to the rm following bad states; we will refer to this policy as rent smoothing. Note that this is a balanced-budget policy in that the expected transfer is zero.
Under the rent-smoothing policy, the prot-maximizing robust contract is determined by: where the possibility of exogenous separation is left aside for simplicity. Observe that rent smoothing serves to loosen the e¤ort constraint in the bad state, while tightening the e¤ort constraint in the good state. Since the former binds more tightly than the latter when ¿ = 0, it follows that the maximized value of the robust contract can be increased by raising ¿ , so long as the constraint in the good state continues to be satised. In fact, the maximized value will continue to rise until the constraints are equated across the two states, which occurs when:
! Upon severence, a worker and rm may negotiate to withhold this information from the government and split the gains associated with avoiding the tax. Severence taxes are similar to bonds posted with a third party, which we discuss in the Appendix. There we note that, in the setting we study, bonding contracts with a third party are not e¤ective.
That is, the optimal rent-smoothing scheme ensures that the rm and worker obtain the expected value of their relationship, evaluated at the prot-maximizing investment level, in each productivity state; let v S (w) denote the value of this smooth contract. In e¤ect, the government simply provides insurance that smooths the variation in returns across states, making for a more e¢cient contract by ensuring that incentive constraints bind equally in both states. " Figure 8 illustrates the scope for improved welfare under a rent-smoothing policy. Observe that the value of the robust contract rises from v R to v S , and the equilibrium shifts from point A to point B. Further, the value of the fragile contract declines, as the tax tightens the fragile e¤ort constraint, while there is no o¤setting subsidy for maintaining the employment relationship in the bad state. Thus, in contrast to the ring tax, rent smoothing might reduce welfare if it leads to only a modest increase in the value of the robust contract relative to the decline in the value of the fragile contract.
Additional issues arise if ¼ < 1, since in this case rms have an incentive to underinvest relative to rst-best levels due to their failure to realize the full benets of investment (this is the holdup problem discussed by Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979) ). As pointed out in Ramey and Watson (1996) , tight e¤ort constraints may play a benecial role by driving up the investment required for a feasible contract, thereby o¤setting the underinvestment incentive. As a consequence, either of the policies discussed above may exert a counterproductive e¤ect by reducing equilibrium investment relative to the social optimum. A high ring tax, for example, will yield robust contracts, but welfare may be lower if the loosened e¤ort constraints lead to greatly reduced investment levels.
Conclusion
We develop a theory of labor-market contracting in which ine¢cient separations derive from the inability of rms and workers to maintain incentives for cooperative behavior in the face of negative productivity shocks. Such separations occur despite the unlimited ability of rms and workers to renegotiate wage contracts following productivity shocks. The robustness of employment relationships is determined by rms choices of specic investment at the outset of the relationship: when incentive problems are severe and negative productivity shocks are su¢ciently unlikely, rms will opt for fragile contracts leading to ine¢cient separations. In a matching-market equilibrium, aggregate i.i.d. productivity shocks generate bursts of job destruction, and the fragility of contracts implies strong magnication and persistence of these shocks in their e¤ects on output. Further, the fact that ine¢ciency of separations derives from binding incentive constraints motivates new justications for government " Financial institutions may also provide this service to rms, to the extent that third parties can contract over the productivity state.
policies that strengthen employment relationships by loosening these constraints. Our approach to explaining cyclical job destruction contrasts sharply with the alternative restructuring view linking job destruction to workers being attracted to superior opportunities outside of the employment relationship. We have argued in the Introduction that the contractual fragility view, in which job loss is costly for workers, is more consistent with empirical evidence showing that displaced workers bear high costs for a signicant time following job loss. Other evidence also favors contractual fragility. For example, restructuring is linked to economic or technological obsolescence of existing rm/worker matches, suggesting that relationships utilizing older plants should be more prone to restructuring-based job destruction. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1994) , however, nd that older plants do not tend to experience higher rates of job destruction. Such evidence is consistent with contractual fragility, however, in that the form of labor contracts would not be expected to vary systematically with plant age.
More generally, restructuring theories associate recessionary volatility with benecial restructuring, so that less volatile economies may su¤er growth-inhibiting sclerosis deriving from slow replacement of unproductive matches. Thus, at the very least more volatile economies should have output growth rates no lower than those of less volatile economies. In fact, cross-country evidence presented in Ramey and Ramey (1995) links higher output volatility with sharply lower growth, which is consistent with the contractual fragility view to the extent that aggregate productivity is lower in equilibria with fragile as opposed to robust contracts.
In traditional macroeconomic models, rigidities in labor contracting have played a key role in accounting for output and employment uctuations, and our results may be viewed in this light. A central contribution of the present paper is in clarifying the nature of the rigidities that are needed for generating costly recessionary job loss. Rather than rigidities in wage bargaining, we emphasize the importance of technological rigidities deriving from specic investment that cannot be quickly adjusted in the face of negative shocks. Technology commitments of this sort may embody a very wide variety of possible factors, including scale of production, engineering specications and organizational form. Contractual fragility becomes salient precisely to the extent that such technological factors cannot be easily adjusted. By way of contrast, in standard e¢ciency wage models, rms can make very smooth adjustments leading to gradual changes in labor productivity; in such settings, small i.i.d. shocks have minimal e¤ect.
In this paper we have imposed a number of simplifying assumptions in the interest of tractability. Particularly important is the assumption of a constant matching probability, deriving from the joint hypotheses of a xed pool of rms and a constantreturns-to-scale matching technology. Weakening this assumption introduces complications in deriving investment/matching equilibria, since the equilibrium investment level would come to depend on the current state of the pools of unmatched rms and workers. Technical issues aside, however, introducing time-varying matching probabilities would not weaken our main ndings in any important way. Moreover, free-entry-induced variation in the pool of unmatched rms would potentially give one way of o¤setting the countercyclicality of job creation that emerges from the simple, rigid matching technology considered here.
We have also assumed that the sum of the rm and workers returns from doublecrossing their partner, given by x, is nonrandom and independent of the investment level. The analysis is readily reformulated, however, to incorporate a more general specication x i (®), i = G; B , allowing for a wide variety of interpretations as to the particular sources of opportunism. The essential results of this paper will continue to hold in this expanded setting as long as (i) x
is not very much greater than x B (®), so that the e¤ort constraint continues to bind more tightly in the bad state; and (ii) x i (®) is decreasing in ®, or at least is not sharply increasing in ®, making the e¤ort constraints looser as ® rises. If x i (®) should be sharply increasing, then rms would have to engage in costly underinvestment in order to obtain robust contracts, but the basic trade-o¤s emphasized here would remain; see Ramey and Watson (1996) for further analysis of this underinvestment case. More broadly, specic institutional structures may be tied in interesting ways to how e¤ort constraints respond to cyclical shocks and investment, and uncovering the nature of these links represents an important topic for future research. We can decompose the returns from the relationship in a period into sharesz w andz f appropriated by the worker and rm, respectively; that is,z =z w +z f . Suppose the contract species a wage m and a severance transfer n from the rm to the worker to be paid if the relationship is severed (e.g., the court can only observe whether severance occurred, not which party caused it). These transfers can be negative. The wage determines the agents individual shares g w and g f , where g = g w + g f . Suppose that condition (1) holds. Set m so that Ez f + ±g f¸xf + ±w f and Ez w + ±g w¸xw + ±w w . The severance transfer n is added to x w and subtracted from x f . Assume that the contract is renegotiated every period afterz is realized, so that z f + ±g f¸xf ¡ n + ±w f and z w + ±g w¸xw + n + ±w w . Adding the appropriate wage term m to both sides of these inequalities, it follows that these conditions imply the agents have the individual incentive to cooperate. This proves that inequality (1) is su¢cient for cooperation. This construction is easily modied for the setting in which the relationship is severed endogenously, which is studied below.
Our contracting assumptions are motivated by and consistent with the following legal setting. Assume that a Court enforces contracts, but the Court observes nothing about an individual relationship. Both the rm and the worker, however, can provide evidence to the Court regarding the status of their relationship (severed or viable). That is, if their relationship is severed because of low e¤ort or for exogenous reasons the rm and the worker can individually prove that the relationship has been severed. The agents cannot prove what e¤ort levels were chosen, however. In this legal environment, the rm and the worker can write an enforceable contract specifying an up-front transfer, a severance transfer, and a transfer to be made each period conditional on employment. Upon severance, the rm will provide evidence to the Court in order to stop the per-period wage transfers, assuming that these transfers are positive. If the transfers are from the worker to the rm then the worker will provide the evidence. No other contracts can be enforced.
Bonding contracts with a third party are not e¤ective in this setting as long as the third party cannot prove that a relationship is severed. Furthermore, the agents cannot on their own commit to transfer resources to a third party (or destroy resources) when their relationship is severed. If the rm and worker wrote such a contract, they would renegotiate it upon severance so that no transfer to a third party would take place.
6.2.
Robust and Fragile Contracts with Exogenous Separations.
Here we reformulate expressions (3) and (4) to incorporate the possibility of exogenous separation. Prot-maximizing investment for a robust contract is now given by: Using the denition of g R (®; w), the robust-contract e¤ort constraint (10) can be written as:
(1 ¡¯)(1 ¡ ±)±w:
(12) Likewise, the fragile e¤ort constraint becomes: (13) It is obvious from these inequalities that the e¤ort constraints tighten as the sum of outside values w increases. A casual look at the left side of these inequalities reveals that one generally does not imply the other. Depending on x, the functions z G and z B , and the value ®, either of the robust and fragile constraints can be tighter. 6 .3.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proposition will be proven for the more general case incorporating the possibility of exogenous separations, introduced in Section 3. We rst prove that the robust contract yields a greater expected return than the fragile contract when the former is feasible. Collecting terms and simplifying yields (14) which is implied by the robust e¤ort constraint (12) , using the fact that x > 0.
Suppose now that ¼g In this section we establish restrictions on ¼ and x assuring existence of positive-investment market equilibria. We focus on a condition that can be used for the case of small ½, understanding that a more complete set of conditions may be readily derived. To this end, we impose the following:
(15) Observe that (15) requires the sum of agents returns from low e¤ort, given by x, to lie below the returns from cooperation in the good state, appropriately discounted, at the level of investment giving zero prots to the rm. Were (15) to fail, the rm would necessarily lose money at values of ® su¢ciently large to allow the e¤ort constraint to be satised.
To establish existence of a positive-investment market equilibrium for su¢ciently small ½, consider rst the case in which ½ = 0. Note that g F (®; w) = g R (®; w) when ½ = 0, and in addition, the robust e¤ort constraint (12) is tighter than the fragile e¤ort constraint (13) . Thus, regardless of w, the rm weakly prefers a fragile contract. Dene w Z by:
Observe that w Z is the value of the outside opportunity such that the fragile e¤ort constraint (13) Substituting for w Z , using its denition, yields: where the inequality invokes (15 F (w ¤ ) = 1 , which characterizes a market equilibrium. Next consider ½ > 0. The value of the employment relationship is v(w), which equals either v F (w) or v R (w) depending on the type of contract associated with the rms optimal investment. As above, there is a number w Z ½ such that the rms optimal positive investment yields it zero in the employment relationship. Since the rm obtains only the fraction ¼ of the returns net of the investment, v may be discontinuous at values of w at which the rm is indi¤erent between the optimal robust and fragile investment levels. Allowing the rm to randomize in such cases, we may treat v(w) as a closed-and convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Note that the objective functions and constraints of the robust and fragile contracting problems are continuous in ½, and recall that g Finally, we verify that the outside option constraint on contract negotiations will not bind. Let ® ¤ denote the equilibrium investment level corresponding to an equilibrium contract of type i, i = R; F . For the rm, we have: Intuitively, condition (16) implies that incentive problems are severe enough to make e¤ort constraints bind. For small values of ½, the fragile contract becomes more attractive to rms, for the reasons discussed in Section 2. Condition (15), however, ensures that incentive problems are not so great that protable investment is ruled out. Satisfying both conditions may require ¼ to be large enough to leave the rm with su¢cient prots following contract negotiation with the worker. Alternatively, if investment is contractible, then we have ¼ = 1 and there is always a range of x jointly satisfying (8) and (15) . 6 .5.
Conditions for Magnication.
Here we show how to compute the magnication bound (9) of Subsection 3.4. In a fragile equilibrium, rms select an investment such that the constraint in (11) is satised, but not that in (10) . A necessary condition is thus: Comparing (2) and (10), it is clear that the solution to (10) 
It can be veried that the rst term on the right-hand side of (17) is strictly less than the corresponding term in (18) . Since the robust e¤ort constraint is binding, we have 
